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Abstract
Recent evidence has emerged linking coordinated campaigns
by state-sponsored actors to manipulate public opinion on the
Web. Campaigns revolving around major political events are
enacted via mission-focused “trolls.” While trolls are involved
in spreading disinformation on social media, there is little un-
derstanding of how they operate, what type of content they dis-
seminate, how their strategies evolve over time, and how they
influence the Web’s information ecosystem.
In this paper, we begin to address this gap by analyzing 10M
posts by 5.5K Twitter and Reddit users identified as Russian
and Iranian state-sponsored trolls. We compare the behavior of
each group of state-sponsored trolls with a focus on how their
strategies change over time, the different campaigns they em-
bark on, and differences between the trolls operated by Russia
and Iran. Among other things, we find: 1) that Russian trolls
were pro-Trump while Iranian trolls were anti-Trump; 2) evi-
dence that campaigns undertaken by such actors are influenced
by real-world events; and 3) that the behavior of such actors
is not consistent over time, hence automated detection is not
a straightforward task. Using the Hawkes Processes statistical
model, we quantify the influence these accounts have on push-
ing URLs on four social platforms: Twitter, Reddit, 4chan’s Po-
litically Incorrect board (/pol/), and Gab. In general, Russian
trolls were more influential and efficient in pushing URLs to all
the other platforms with the exception of /pol/ where Iranians
were more influential. Finally, we release our data and source
code to ensure the reproducibility of our results and to encour-
age other researchers to work on understanding other emerging
kinds of state-sponsored troll accounts on Twitter.
1 Introduction
Recent political events and elections have been increasingly ac-
companied by reports of disinformation campaigns attributed
to state-sponsored actors [16]. In particular, “troll farms,” al-
legedly employed by Russian state agencies, have been actively
commenting and posting content on social media to further the
Kremlin’s political agenda [45].
Despite the growing relevance of state-sponsored disinfor-
mation, the activity of accounts linked to such efforts has not
been thoroughly studied. Previous work has mostly looked at
campaigns run by bots [16, 22, 37]. However, automated con-
tent diffusion is only a part of the issue. In fact, recent research
has shown that human actors are actually key in spreading false
information on Twitter [42]. Overall, many aspects of state-
sponsored disinformation remain unclear, e.g., how do state-
sponsored trolls operate? What kind of content do they dissemi-
nate? How does their behavior change over time? And, perhaps
more importantly, is it possible to quantify the influence they
have on the overall information ecosystem on the Web?
In this paper, we aim to address these questions, by rely-
ing on two different sources of ground truth data about state-
sponsored actors. First, we use 10M tweets posted by Russian
and Iranian trolls between 2012 and 2018 [20]. Second, we use
a list of 944 Russian trolls, identified by Reddit, and find all
their posts between 2015 and 2018 [38]. We analyze the two
datasets across several axes in order to understand their behav-
ior and how it changes over time, their targets, and the content
they shared. For the latter, we leverage word embeddings to un-
derstand in what context specific words/hashtags are used and
shed light to the ideology of the trolls. Also, we use Hawkes
Processes [29] to model the influence that the Russian and Ira-
nian trolls had over multiple Web communities; namely, Twit-
ter, Reddit, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) [23], and
Gab [53].
Main findings. Our study leads to several key observations:
1. Our influence estimation experiments reveal that Russian
trolls were extremely influential and efficient in spreading
URLs on Twitter. Also, when we compare their influence
and efficiency to Iranian trolls, we find that Russian trolls
were more efficient and influential in spreading URLs on
Twitter, Reddit, Gab, but not on /pol/.
2. By leveraging word embeddings, we find ideological dif-
ferences between Russian and Iranian trolls. For instance,
we find that Russian trolls were pro-Trump, while Iranian
trolls were anti-Trump.
3. We find evidence that the Iranian campaigns were mo-
tivated by real-world events. Specifically, campaigns
against France and Saudi Arabia coincided with real-world
events that affect the relations between these countries and
Iran.
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4. We observe that the behavior of trolls varies over time. We
find substantial changes in the use of language and Twit-
ter clients over time for both Russian and Iranian trolls.
These insights allow us to understand the targets of the
orchestrated campaigns for each type of trolls over time.
5. We find that the topics of interest and discussion vary
across Web communities. For example, we find evidence
that Russian trolls on Reddit were extensively discussing
about cryptocurrencies, while this does not apply in great
extent for the Russian trolls on Twitter.
Finally, we make our source code publicly available [56] for
reproducibility purposes and to encourage researchers to fur-
ther work on understanding other types of state-sponsored trolls
on Twitter (i.e., on January 31, 2019, Twitter released data re-
lated to state-sponsored trolls originating from Venezuela and
Bangladesh [40]).
2 Related Work
We now review previous work on opinion manipulation as well
as politically motivated disinformation on the Web.
Opinion manipulation. The practice of swaying opinion in
Web communities has become a hot-button issue as malicious
actors are intensifying their efforts to push their subversive
agenda. Kumar et al. [27] study how users create multiple ac-
counts, called sockpuppets, that actively participate in some
communities with the goal to manipulate users’ opinions. Mi-
haylov et al. [31] show that trolls can indeed manipulate users’
opinions in online forums. In follow-up work, Mihaylov and
Nakov [32] highlight two types of trolls: those paid to oper-
ate and those that are called out as such by other users. Then,
Volkova and Bell [48] aim to predict the deletion of Twitter
accounts because they are trolls, focusing on those that shared
content related to the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
Elyashar et al. [15] distinguish authentic discussions from
campaigns to manipulate the public’s opinion, using a set of
similarity functions alongside historical data. Also, Steward et
al. [43] focus on discussions related to the Black Lives Matter
movement and how content from Russian trolls was retweeted
by other users. Using community detection techniques, they un-
veil that Russian trolls infiltrated both left and right leaning
communities, setting out to push specific narratives. Finally,
Varol et al. [47] aim to identify memes (ideas) that become pop-
ular due to coordinated efforts, and achieve a 75% AUC score
before memes become trending and a 95% AUC score after-
wards.
False information on the political stage. Conover et al. [9] fo-
cus on Twitter activity over the six weeks leading to the 2010
US midterm elections and the interactions between right and
left leaning communities. Ratkiewicz et al. [37] study political
campaigns using multiple controlled accounts to disseminate
support for an individual or opinion. Specifically, they use ma-
chine learning to detect the early stages of false political infor-
mation spreading on Twitter. Wong et al. [51] aim to quantify
the political leanings of users and news outlets during the 2012
US presidential election on Twitter by formulating the problem
as an ill-posed linear inverse problem, and using an inference
engine that considers tweeting and retweeting behavior of ar-
ticles. Yang et al. [52] investigate the topics of discussions on
Twitter for 51 US political persons showing that Democrats and
Republicans are active in a similar way on Twitter, although
the former tend to use hashtags more frequently. Le et al. [28]
study 50M tweets pertaining to the 2016 US election primaries
and highlight the importance of three factors in political dis-
cussions on social media, namely the party (e.g., Republican
or Democrat), policy considerations (e.g., foreign policy), and
personality of the candidates (e.g., intelligent or determined).
Howard and Kollanyi [24] study the role of bots in Twitter
conversations during the 2016 Brexit referendum. They find
that most tweets are in favor of Brexit, that there are bots with
various levels of automation, and that 1% of the accounts gen-
erate 33% of the overall messages. Also, Hegelich and Janet-
zko [22] investigate whether bots on Twitter are used as po-
litical actors. By exposing and analyzing 1.7K bots on Twitter
during the Russia-Ukraine conflict, they uncover their politi-
cal agenda and show that bots exhibit various behaviors, e.g.,
trying to hide their identity, promoting topics through the use
of hashtags, and retweeting messages with particularly inter-
esting content. Badawy et al. [3] aim to predict users that are
likely to spread information from state-sponsored actors, while
Dutt et al. [13] focus on the Facebook platform and analyze
ads shared by Russian trolls in order to find the cues that make
them effective. Finally, a large body of work focuses on social
bots [5, 10, 17, 16, 46] and their role in spreading political dis-
information, highlighting that they can manipulate the public’s
opinion at a large scale, thus potentially affecting the outcome
of political elections.
Remarks. Unlike previous work, our study focuses on a set
of Russian and Iranian trolls that were suspended by Twitter
and Reddit. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the
first effort not only to characterize a ground truth of troll ac-
counts independently identified by Twitter and Reddit, but also
to quantify their influence on the greater Web, specifically, on
Twitter as well as on other communities like Reddit, 4chan, and
Gab.
3 Background
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the social net-
works studied in this paper, i.e., Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and
Gab, which we choose because they are impactful actors on the
Web’s information ecosystem [55, 54, 53, 23]. Note that the two
latter Web communities are only used in our influence estima-
tion experiments (see Section 6), where we aim to understand
the influence that trolls had to these Web communities.
Twitter. Twitter is a mainstream social network, where users
can broadcast short messages, called “tweets,” to their follow-
ers. Tweets may contain hashtags, which enable the easy index
and search of messages, as well as mentions, which refer to
other users on Twitter.
Reddit. Reddit is a news aggregator with several social fea-
2
Platform Origin of trolls # trolls # trollswith tweets/posts # of tweets/posts
Twitter Russia 3,836 3,667 9,041,308
Iran 770 660 1,122,936
Reddit Russia 944 335 21,321
Table 1: Overview of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
We report the overall number of identified trolls, the trolls that had at
least one tweet/post, and the overall number of tweets/posts.
tures. It allows users to post URLs along with a title; posts can
get up- and down- votes, which dictate the popularity and or-
der in which they appear on the platform. Reddit is divided to
“subreddits,” which are forums created by users that focus on a
particular topic (e.g., /r/The Donald is about discussions around
Donald Trump).
4chan. 4chan is an imageboard forum, organized in communi-
ties called “boards,” each with a different topic of interest. A
user can create a new post by uploading an image with or with-
out some text; others can reply below with or without images.
4chan is an anonymous community, and several of its boards
are reportedly responsible for a substantial amount of hateful
content [23]. In this work we focus on the Politically Incor-
rect board (/pol/) mainly because it is the main board for the
discussion of politics and world events. Furthermore, 4chan is
ephemeral, i.e., there is a limited number of active threads and
all threads are permanently deleted after a week. We collect our
4chan dataset, between June 30, 2016, and October 20, 2018,
using the methodology described in [23], ultimately collecting
98M posts.
Gab. Gab is a social network launched in August 2016 aim-
ing to provide a platform for free speech and explicitly wel-
comes users banned from other communities.. It combines fea-
tures from Twitter (broadcast of 300-character messages, called
“gabs”) and Reddit (content popularity according to a vot-
ing system). It also has extremely lax moderation policies; it
allows everything except illegal pornography, terrorist propa-
ganda, and doxing [41]. Overall, Gab attracts alt-right users,
conspiracy theorists, and high volumes of hate speech [53]. We
collect 46M posts, posted on Gab between August 10, 2016 and
October 20, 2018, using the same methodology as in [53].
4 Troll Datasets
In this section, we describe our dataset of Russian and Iranian
trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
Twitter. On October 17, 2018, Twitter released a large dataset
of Russian and Iranian troll accounts [20]. Although the ex-
act methodology used to determine that these accounts were
state-sponsored trolls is unknown, based on the most recent De-
partment of Justice indictment [11], the dataset appears to have
been constructed in a manner that we can assume essentially
no false positives, while we cannot make any postulation about
false negatives. Table 1 summarizes the troll dataset.
Reddit. On April 10, 2018, Reddit released a list of 944 ac-
counts which they determined were operated by actors work-
ing on behalf of the Russian government [38]. We recover
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Figure 1: Number of Russian and Iranian troll accounts created per
week.
Russian troll on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Word (%) Bigrams (%) Word (%) Bigrams (%)
follow 7.7% follow me 6.4% journalist 3.6% human rights 1.6%
love 4.8% breaking news 0.8% news 3.2% independent news 1.4%
life 4.5% donald trump 0.7% independent 2.8% news media 1.4%
trump 4.4% lokale nachrichten 0.6% lover (in Farsi) 2.6% media organization 1.4%
conservative 4.3% nachrichten aus 0.6% social 2.6% organization aim 1.4%
news 3.4% hier kannst 0.6% politics 2.6% aim inspire 1.4%
maga 3.4% kannst du 0.6% media 2.4% inspire action 1.4%
lbl 2.4% du wichtige 0.6% love 2.2% action likes 1.4%
will 2.4% wichtige und 0.6% justice 2.0% likes social 1.4%
proud 2.2% und aktuelle 0.6% low (in Farsi) 2.0% social justice 1.4%
Table 2: Top 10 words and bigrams found in the descriptions of Rus-
sian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
the submissions, comments, and account details for these ac-
counts using two mechanisms: 1) dumps of Reddit provided
by Pushshift [35]; and 2) crawling the user pages of those ac-
counts. Although omitted for lack of space, we note that the
union of these two data sources reveals some gaps in both,
likely due to a combination of subreddit moderators removing
posts or the troll users themselves deleting them, which would
affect the two data sources in different ways. In any case, for
our purposes, we merge the two datasets, with Table 1 describ-
ing the final dataset. Note that only about one third (335) of
the accounts released by Reddit had at least one submission or
comment in our dataset. We suspect the rest were simply used
as dedicated upvote/downvote accounts used in an effort to push
(or bury) specific content.
Ethics. Although we only work with publicly available data,
we follow standard ethical guidelines [39] and make no attempt
to de-anonymize users.
5 Analysis
In this section, we present an in-depth analysis of the activities
and the behavior of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and
Reddit.
5.1 Accounts Characteristics
First we explore when the accounts appeared, what they
posed as, and how many followers/friends they had on Twitter.
Account Creation. Fig. 1 plots the Russian and Iranian troll ac-
counts creation dates on Twitter and Reddit. We observe that the
majority of Russian troll accounts were created around the time
of the Ukrainian conflict: 80% of have an account creation date
earlier than 2016. That said, there are some meaningful peaks
in account creation during 2016 and 2017. 57 accounts were
created between July 3-17, 2016, which was right before the
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Figure 2: CDF of the number of a) followers and b) friends for the
Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
start of the Republican National Convention (July 18-21) where
Donald Trump was named the Republican nominee for Presi-
dent [49] . Later, 190 accounts were created between July, 2017
and August, 2017, during the run up to the infamous Unite the
Right rally in Charlottesville [50]. Taken together, this might be
evidence of coordinated activities aimed at manipulating users’
opinions on Twitter with respect to specific events. This is fur-
ther evidenced when examining the Russian trolls on Reddit:
75% of Russian troll accounts on Reddit were created in a sin-
gle massive burst in the first half of 2015. Also, there are a few
smaller spikes occurring just prior to the 2016 US Presidential
election. For the Iranian trolls on Twitter we observe that they
are much “younger,” with the larger bursts of account creation
after the 2016 US Presidential election.
Account Information. To avoid being obvious, state sponsored
trolls might attempt to present a persona that masks their true
nature or otherwise ingratiates themselves to their target audi-
ence. By examining the profile description of trolls we can get
a feeling for how they might have cultivated this persona. In
Table 2, we report the top ten words and bigrams that appear
in profile descriptions of trolls on Twitter. Note that we do this
only for Twitter trolls as we do not have descriptions for Reddit
accounts. From the table we see that a relatively large number
of Russian trolls pose as news outlets, with “news” (1.3%) and
“breaking news” (0.8%) appearing in their description. Further,
they seem to use their profile description to more explicitly in-
crease their reach on Twitter, by nudging users to follow them
(e.g., “follow me” appearing in almost 6.4% of profile descrip-
tions). Finally, 3.4% of the Russian trolls describe themselves
as Trump supporters: see “trump” (4.4%) and “maga” (3.4%)
terms. Iranian trolls are even more likely to pose as news outlets
or journalists: 3.6% have “journalist” and 3.2% have “news”
in their profile descriptions. This highlights that accounts that
pose as news outlets may in fact be accounts controlled by state-
sponsored actors, hence regular users should critically think in
order to assess whether the account is credible or not.
Followers/Friends. Fig. 2 plots the CDF of the number of fol-
lowers and friends for both Russian and Iranian trolls. 25% of
Iranian trolls had more than 1k followers, while the same ap-
plies for only 15% of the Russian trolls. In general, Iranian
trolls tend to have more followers than Russian trolls (median
of 392 and 132, respectively). Both Russian and Iranian trolls
tend to follow a large number of users, probably in an attempt
to increase their follower count via reciprocal follows. Iranian
trolls have a median followers to friends ratio of 0.51, while
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Figure 3: Temporal characteristics of tweets from Russian and Iranian
trolls.
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Figure 4: Percentage of unique trolls that were active per week.
Russian trolls have a ratio of 0.74. This might indicate that
Iranian trolls were more effective in acquiring followers with-
out resorting in massive followings of other users, or perhaps
that they took advantages of services that offer followers for
sale [44].
5.2 Temporal Analysis
We next explore aggregate troll activity over time, looking
for behavioral patterns. Fig. 3(a) plots the (normalized) volume
of tweets/posts shared per week in our dataset. We observe that
both Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter became active during
the Ukrainian conflict. Although lower in overall volume, there
an increasing trend starts around August 2016 and continues
through summer of 2017.
We also see three major spikes in activity by Russian trolls on
Reddit. The first is during the latter half of 2015, approximately
around the time that Donald Trump announced his candidacy
for President. Next, we see solid activity through the middle of
2016, trailing off shortly before the election. Finally, we see an-
other burst of activity in late 2017 through early 2018, at which
point the trolls were detected and had their accounts locked by
Reddit.
Next, we examine the hour of day and week that the trolls
post. Fig. 3(b) shows that Russian trolls on Twitter are active
throughout the day, while on Reddit they are particularly ac-
tive during the first hours of the day. Similarly, Iranian trolls on
Twitter tend to be active from early morning until 13:00 UTC.
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Figure 5: Number of trolls that posted their first/last tweet/post for
each week in our dataset.
In Fig. 3(c), we report temporal characteristics based on hour of
the week, finding that Russian trolls on Twitter follow a diur-
nal pattern with slightly less activity during Sunday. In contrast,
Russian trolls on Reddit and Iranian trolls on Twitter are partic-
ularly active during the first days of the week, while their ac-
tivity decreases during the weekend. For Iranians this is likely
due to the Iranian work week being from Sunday to Wednesday
with a half day on Thursday.
But are all trolls in our dataset active throughout the span of
our datasets? To answer this question, we plot the percentage
of unique troll accounts that are active per week in Fig. 4 from
which we draw the following observations. First, the Russian
troll campaign on Twitter targeting Ukraine was much more di-
verse in terms of accounts when compared to later campaigns.
There are several possible explanations for this. One explana-
tion is that trolls learned from their Ukrainian campaign and be-
came more efficient in later campaigns, perhaps relying on large
networks of bots in their earlier campaigns which were later
abandoned in favor of more focused campaigns like project
Lakhta [12]. Another explanation could be that attacks on the
US election might have required “better trained” trolls, perhaps
those that could speak English more convincingly. The Irani-
ans, on the other hand, seem to be slowly building their troll
army over time. There is a steadily increasing number of active
trolls posting per week over time. We speculate that this is due
to their troll program coming online in a slow-but-steady man-
ner, perhaps due to more effective training. Finally, on Reddit
we see most Russian trolls posted irregularly, possibly perform-
ing other operations on the platform like manipulating votes on
other posts.
Next, we investigate the point in time when each troll in our
dataset made his first and last tweet. Fig. 5 shows the number of
users that made their first/last post for each week in our dataset,
which highlights when trolls became active as well as when
they “retired.” We see that Russian trolls on Twitter made their
first posts during early 2014, almost certainly in response to the
Ukrainian conflict. When looking at the last tweets of Russian
trolls on Twitter we see that a substantial portion of the trolls
“retired” by the end of 2015. In all likelihood this is because
the Ukrainian conflict was over and Russia turned their infor-
mation warfare arsenal to other targets (e.g., the USA, this is
also aligned with the increase in the use of English language,
see Section 5.3). When looking at Russian trolls on Reddit, we
do not see a substantial spike in first posts close to the time that
the majority of the accounts were created (see Fig. 1). This in-
dicates that the newly created Russian trolls on Reddit became
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Figure 6: Number of tweets that contain mentions among Russian
trolls and among Iranian trolls on Twitter.
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Figure 7: CDF of number of (a) languages used (b) clients used for
Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
active gradually (in terms of posting behavior).
Finally, we assess whether Russian and Iranian trolls men-
tion or retweet each other, and how this behavior occurs over
time. Fig. 6 shows the number of tweets that were men-
tioning/retweeting other trolls’ tweets over the course of our
datasets. Russian trolls were particularly fond of this strat-
egy during 2014 and 2015, while Iranian trolls started using
this strategy after August, 2017. This again highlights how the
strategies employed by trolls adapts and evolves to new cam-
paigns.
5.3 Languages and Clients
In this section, we study the languages that Russian and Ira-
nian Twitter trolls posted in, as well as their Twitter clients they
used to make tweets (this information is not available for Red-
dit).
Languages. First we study the languages used by trolls as it
provides an indication of their targets. The language informa-
tion is included in the datasets released by Twitter. Fig. 7(a)
plots the CDF of the number of languages used by troll ac-
counts. We find that 80% and 75% of the Russian and Iranian
trolls, respectively, use more than 2 languages. Next, we note
that in general, Iranian trolls tend to use fewer languages than
Russian trolls. The most popular language for Russian trolls
is Russian (53% of all tweets), followed by English (36%),
Deutsch (1%), and Ukrainian (0.9%). For Iranian trolls we find
that French is the most popular language (28% of tweets), fol-
lowed by English (24%), Arabic (13%), and Turkish (8%).
Fig. 8 plots the use of different languages over time. Fig. 8(a)
and Fig. 8(b) plot the percentage of tweets that were in a given
language on a given week for Russian and Iranian trolls, re-
spectively, in a stacked fashion, which lets us see how the us-
age of different languages changed over time relative to each
other. Fig. 8(c) and Fig. 8(d) plot the language use from a dif-
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Figure 8: Use of the four most popular languages by Russian and Ira-
nian trolls over time on Twitter. (a) and (b) show the percentage of
weekly tweets in each language. (c) and (d) show the percentage of
total tweets per language that occurred in a given week.
ferent perspective: normalized to the overall number of tweets
in a given language. This view gives us a better idea of how the
use of each particular language changed over time. From the
plots we make the following observations. First, there is a clear
shift in targets based on the campaign. For example, Fig. 8(a)
shows that the overwhelming majority of early tweets by Rus-
sian trolls were in Russian, with English only reaching the vol-
ume of Russian language tweets in 2016. This coincides with
the “retirement” of several Russian trolls on Twitter (see Fig 5).
Next, we see evidence of other campaigns, for example German
language tweets begin showing up in early to mid 2016, and
reach their highest volume in the latter half of 2017, in close
proximity with the 2017 German Federal elections. Addition-
ally, we note that Russian language tweets have a huge drop off
in activity the last two months of 2017.
For the Iranians, we see more obvious evidence of multi-
ple campaigns. For example, although Turkish and English are
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Figure 9: Use of the eight most popular clients by Russian and Iranian
trolls over time on Twitter.
present for most of the timeline, French quickly becomes a
commonly used language in the latter half of 2013, becom-
ing the dominant language used from around May 2014 until
the end of 2015. This is likely due to political events that hap-
pened during this time period. E.g., in November, 2013 France
blocked a stopgap deal related to Iran’s uranium enrichment
program [21], leading to some fiery rhetoric from Iran’s govern-
ment (and apparently the launch of a troll campaign targeting
French speakers). As tweets in French fall off, we also observe
a dramatic increase in the use of Arabic in early 2016. This co-
incides with an attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran [33], the
primary reason the two countries ended diplomatic relations.
When looking at the language usage normalized by the total
number of tweets in that language, we can get a more focused
perspective. In particular, from Fig. 8(c) it becomes strikingly
clear that the initial burst of Russian troll activity was targeted
at Ukraine, with the majority of Ukrainian language tweets co-
inciding directly with the Crimean conflict [4]. From Fig. 8(d)
we observe that English language tweets from Iranian trolls,
while consistently present over time, have a relative peak cor-
responding with French language tweets, likely indicating an
attempt to influence non-French speakers with respect to the
campaign against French speakers.
Client usage. Finally, we analyze the clients used to post
tweets. When looking at the most popular clients, we find that
Russian and Iranian trolls use the main Twitter Web Client
(28.5% for Russian trolls, and 62.2% for Iranian trolls). This
is in contrast with what normal users use: using a random set of
Twitter users, we find that mobile clients make up a large chunk
of tweets (48%), followed by the TweetDeck dashboard (32%).
We next look at how many different clients trolls use through-
out our dataset: in Fig. 7(b), we plot the CDF of the number
of clients used per user. 25% and 21% of the Russian and Ira-
nian trolls, respectively, use only one client, while in general
6
Figure 10: Distribution of reported locations for tweets by Russian trolls (100%) (red circles) and Iranian trolls (green triangles).
Russian trolls tend to use more clients than Iranians.
Fig. 9 plots the usage of clients over time in terms of weekly
tweets by Russian and Iranian trolls. We observe that the Rus-
sians (Fig. 9(a)) started off with almost exclusive use of the
“twitterfeed” client. Usage of this client drops off when it was
shutdown in October, 2016. During the Ukrainian crisis, how-
ever, we see several new clients come into the mix. Iranians
(Fig. 9(b)) started off almost exclusively using the “facebook”
Twitter client. To the best of our knowledge, this is a client that
automatically Tweets any posts you make on Facebook, indicat-
ing that Iranians likely started with a campaign on Facebook. At
the beginning of 2014, we see a shift to using the Twitter Web
Client, which only begins to decrease towards the end of 2015.
Of particular note in Fig. 9(b) is the appearance of “dlvr.it,”
an automated social media manager, in the beginning of 2015.
This corresponds with the creation of IUVM [25], which is a
fabricated ecosystem of (fake) news outlets and social media
accounts created by the Iranians, and might indicate that Ira-
nian trolls stepped up their game around that time, starting us-
ing services that allowed them for better account orchestration
to run their campaigns more effectively.
5.4 Geographical Analysis
We then study users’ location, relying on the self-reported
location field in their profiles, since only very few tweets have
actual GPS coordinates. Note that this field is not required, and
users are also able to change it whenever they like, so we look
at locations for each tweet. Note that 16.8% and 20.9% of the
tweets from Russian and Iranians trolls, respectively, do not in-
clude a self-reported location. To infer the geographical loca-
tion from the self-reported text, we use pigeo [36], which pro-
vides geographical information (e.g., latitude, longitude, coun-
try, etc.) given the text that corresponds to a location. Specif-
ically, we extract 626 self-reported locations for the Russian
trolls and 201 locations for the Iranian trolls. Then, we use pi-
geo to systematically obtain a geographical location (and its
associated coordinates) for each text that corresponds to a lo-
cation. Fig. 10 shows the locations inferred for Russian trolls
(red circles) and Iranian trolls (green triangles). The size of the
Russian trolls on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Word CosineSimilarity Word
Cosine
Similarity
trumparmi 0.68 impeachtrump 0.81
trumptrain 0.67 stoptrump 0.80
votetrump 0.65 fucktrump 0.79
makeamericagreatagain 0.65 trumpisamoron 0.79
draintheswamp 0.62 dumptrump 0.79
trumppenc 0.61 ivankatrump 0.77
@realdonaldtrump 0.59 theresist 0.76
wakeupamerica 0.58 trumpresign 0.76
thursdaythought 0.57 notmypresid 0.76
realdonaldtrump 0.57 worstpresidentev 0.75
presidenttrump 0.57 antitrump 0.74
Table 3: Top 10 similar words to “maga” and their respective cosine
similarities (obtained from the word2vec models).
shapes on the map indicates the number of tweets that appear
on each location. We observe that most of the tweets from Rus-
sian trolls come from locations within Russia (34%), the USA
(29%), and some from European countries, like United King-
dom (16%), Germany (0.8%), and Ukraine (0.6%). This sug-
gests that Russian trolls may be pretending to be from certain
countries, e.g., USA or United Kingdom, aiming to pose as lo-
cals and effectively manipulate opinions. A similar pattern ex-
ists with Iranian trolls, which were particularly active in France
(26%), Brazil (9%), the USA (8%), Turkey (7%), and Saudi
Arabia (7%). It is also worth noting that Iranians trolls, un-
like Russian trolls, did not report locations from their country,
indicating that these trolls were primarily used for campaigns
targeting foreign countries. Finally, we note that the location-
based findings are in-line with the findings on the languages
analysis (see Section 5.3), further evidencing that both Russian
and Iranian trolls were specifically targeting different countries
over time.
5.5 Content Analysis
Word Embeddings. Recent indictments by the US Department
of Justice have indicated that troll messaging was crafted, with
certain phrases and terminology designated for use in certain
contexts. To get a better handle on how this was expressed, we
build two word2vec models on the corpus of tweets: one for the
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Figure 11: Visualization of the top hashtags used by a) Russian trolls on Twitter (see [2] for interactive version) and b) Iranian trolls on Twitter
(see [1] for an interactive version).
Russian trolls on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%)
news 9.5% USA 0.7% Iran 1.8% Palestine 0.6%
sports 3.8% breaking 0.7% Trump 1.4% Syria 0.5%
politics 3.0% TopNews 0.6% Israel 1.1% Saudi 0.5%
local 2.1% BlackLivesMatter 0.6% Yemen 0.9% EEUU 0.5%
world 1.1% true 0.5% FreePalestine 0.8% Gaza 0.5%
MAGA 1.1% Texas 0.5% QudsDay4Return 0.8% SaudiArabia 0.4%
business 1.0% NewYork 0.4% US 0.7% Iuvm 0.4%
Chicago 0.9% Fukushima2015 0.4% realiran 0.6% InternationalQudsDay2018 0.4%
health 0.8% quote 0.4% ISIS 0.6% Realiran 0.4%
love 0.7% Foke 0.4% DeleteIsrael 0.6% News 0.4%
Table 4: Top 20 (English) hashtags in tweets from Russian and Iranian
trolls on Twitter.
Russian trolls and one for the Iranian trolls. To train the models,
we first extract the tweets posted in English, according to the
data provided by Twitter. Then, we remove stop words, perform
stemming, tokenize the tweets, and keep only words that appear
at least 500 and 100 times for the Russian and Iranian trolls,
respectively.
Table 3 shows the top 10 most similar terms to “maga” for
each model. We see a marked difference between its usage by
Russian and Iranian trolls. Russian trolls are clearly pushing
heavily in favor of Donald Trump, while it is the exact opposite
with Iranians.
Hashtags. Next, we aim to understand the use of hashtags
with a focus on the ones written in English. In Table 4, we
report the top 20 English hashtags for both Russian and Ira-
nian trolls. State-sponsored trolls appear to use hashtags to dis-
seminate news (9.5%) and politics (3.0%) related content, but
also use several that might be indicators of propaganda and/or
controversial topics, e.g., #BlackLivesMatter. For instance, one
notable example is: “WATCH: Here is a typical #BlackLives-
Matter protester: ‘I hope I kill all white babes!’ #BatonRouge
<url>” on July 17, 2016. Note that <url> denotes a link.
Fig. 11 shows a visualization of hashtag usage built from the
two word2vec models. Here, we show hashgtags used in a sim-
ilar context, by constructing a graph where nodes are words
that correspond to hashtags from the word2vec models, and
edges are weighted by the cosine distances (as produced by
the word2vec models) between the hashtags. After trimming
out all edges between nodes with weight less than a threshold,
based on methodology from [18], we run the community detec-
tion heuristic presented in [7], and mark each community with a
different color. Finally, the graph is layed out with the ForceAt-
las2 algorithm [26], which takes into account the weight of the
edges when laying out the nodes in 2-dimensional space. Note
that the size of the nodes is proportional to the number of times
the hashtag appeared in each dataset.
We first observe that, in Fig. 11(a) there is a central mass of
what we consider “general audience” hashtags (see green com-
munity on the center of the graph): hashtags related to a holi-
day or a specific trending topic (but non-political) hashtag. In
the bottom right portion of the plot we observe “general news”
related categories; in particular American sports related hash-
tags (e.g., “baseball”). Next, we see a community of hashtags
(light blue, towards the bottom left of the graph) clearly related
to Trump’s attacks on Hillary Clinton.
The Iranian trolls again show different behavior. There is
a community of hashtags related to nuclear talks (orange), a
community related to Palestine (light blue), and a community
that is clearly anti-Trump (pink). The central green community
exposes some of the ways they pushed the IUVM fake news
network by using innocuous hashtags like “#MyDatingProfile-
Says” as well as politically motivated ones like “#JerusalemIs-
TheEternalCapitalOfPalestine.”
We also study when these hashtags are used by the trolls,
finding that most of them are well distributed over time. How-
ever we find some interesting exceptions. We highlight a few
of these in Fig. 12, which plots the top ten hashtags that Rus-
sian and Iranian trolls posted with substantially different rates
before and after the 2016 US Presidential election. The set of
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Figure 12: Top ten hashtags that appear a) c) substantially more times before the US elections rather than after the elections; and b) d) substan-
tially more times after the elections rather than before.
hashtags was determined by examining the relative change in
posting volume before and after the election. From the plots
we make several observations. First, we note that more gen-
eral audience hashtags remain a staple of Russian trolls be-
fore the election (the relative decrease corresponds to the over-
all relative decrease in troll activity following the Crimea con-
flict). They also use relatively innocuous/ephemeral hashtags
like #IHatePokemonGoBeacause, likely in an attempt to hide
the true nature of their accounts. That said, we also see them
attaching to politically divisive hashtags like #BlackLivesMat-
ters around the time that Donald Trump won the Republican
Presidential primaries in June 2016. In the ramp up to the 2016
election, we see a variety of clearly political related hashtags,
with #MAGA seeing substantial peaks starting in early 2017
(higher than any peak during the 2016 Presidential campaigns).
We also see a large number of politically ephemeral hashtags at-
tacking Obama and a campaign to push the border wall between
Mexico. In addition to these politically oriented hashtags, we
again see the usage of ephemeral hashtags related to holidays.
#SurvivalGuideToThanksgiving in late November 2016 is par-
ticularly interesting as it was heavily used for discussing how to
deal with interacting with family members with wildly differ-
ent view points on the recent election results. This hashtag was
exclusively used to give trolls a vector to sow discord. When it
comes to Iranian trolls, we note that, prior to the 2016 election,
they share many posts with hashtags related to Hillary Clinton
(see Fig. 12(c)). After the election they shift to posting nega-
tively about Donald Trump (see Fig. 12(d)).
LDA analysis. We also use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) model [6] to analyze tweets’ semantics. We train an
LDA model for each of the datasets and extract ten distinct top-
ics with ten words, as reported in Table 5. While both Russian
and Iranian trolls tweet about politics related topics, for Iranian
trolls, this seems to be focused more on regional, and possi-
bly even internal issues. For example, “iran” itself is a common
term in several of the topics, as is “israel,” “saudi,” “yemen,”
and “isis.” While both sets of trolls discuss the proxy war in
Syria (in which both states are involved), the Iranian trolls have
topics pertaining to Russia and Putin, while the Russian trolls
do not make any mention of Iran, instead focusing on more
vague political topics like gun control and racism. For Russian
trolls on Reddit (see Table 6) we again find topics related to
politics and cryptocurrencies (e.g., topic 4).
Subreddits. Fig. 13 shows the top 20 subreddits that Rus-
sian trolls on Reddit exploited and their respective percentage
of posts over the whole dataset. The most popular subreddit
is /r/uncen (11% of posts), which is a subreddit created by a
specific Russian troll and, via manual examination, appears to
be primarily used to disseminate news articles of questionable
credibility. Other popular subreddits include general audience
subreddits like /r/funny (6%) and /r/AskReddit (4%), likely in
an attempt to obfuscate the fact that they are state-sponsored
trolls in the same way that innocuous hashtags were used on
Twitter. Finally, it is worth noting that the Russian trolls were
particularly active on communities related to cryptocurrencies
like /r/CryptoCurrency (3.6%) and /r/Bitcoin (1%) possibly at-
tempting to influence the prices of specific cryptocurrencies.
This is particularly noteworthy considering cryptocurrencies
have been reportedly used to launder money, evade capital con-
trols, and perhaps used to evade sanctions [34, 8].
URLs. We next analyze the URLs included in the tweets/posts.
In Table 7, we report the top 20 domains for both Russian
and Iranian trolls. Livejournal (5.4%) is the most popular do-
main in the Russian trolls dataset on Twitter, likely due the
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Topic Terms (Russian trolls on Twitter) Topic Terms (Iranian trolls on Twitter)
1 news, showbiz, photos, baltimore, local, weekend, stocks, friday, small, fatal 1 isis, first, american, young, siege, open, jihad, success, sydney, turkey
2 like, just, love, white, black, people, look, got, one, didn 2 can, people, just, don, will, know, president, putin, like, obama
3 day, will, life, today, good, best, one, usa, god, happy 3 trump, states, united, donald, racist, society, structurally, new, toonsonline, president
4 can, don, people, get, know, make, will, never, want, love 4 saudi, yemen, arabia, israel, war, isis, syria, oil, air, prince
5 trump, obama, president, politics, will, america, media, breaking, gop, video 5 iran, front, press, liberty, will, iranian, irantalks, realiran, tehran, nuclear
6 news, man, police, local, woman, year, old, killed, shooting, death 6 attack, usa, days, terrorist, cia, third, pakistan, predict, cfb, cfede
7 sports, news, game, win, words, nfl, chicago, star, new, beat 7 israeli, israel, palestinian, palestine, gaza, killed, palestinians, children, women, year
8 hillary, clinton, now, new, fbi, video, playing, russia, breaking, comey 8 state, fire, nation, muslim, muslims, rohingya, syrian, sets, ferguson, inferno
9 news, new, politics, state, business, health, world, says, bill, court 9 syria, isis, turkish, turkey, iraq, russian, president, video, girl, erdo
10 nyc, everything, tcot, miss, break, super, via, workout, hot, soon 10 iran, saudi, isis, new, russia, war, chief, israel, arabia, peace
Table 5: Terms extracted from LDA topics of tweets from Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
Topic Terms (Russian trolls on Reddit)
1 like, also, just, sure, korea, new, crypto, tokens, north, show
2 police, cops, man, officer, video, cop, cute, shooting, year, btc
3 old, news, matter, black, lives, days, year, girl, iota, post
4 tie, great, bitcoin, ties, now, just, hodl, buy, good, like
5 media, hahaha, thank, obama, mass, rights, use, know, war, case
6 man, black, cop, white, eth, cops, american, quite, recommend, years
7 clinton, hillary, one, will, can, definitely, another, job, two, state
8 trump, will, donald, even, well, can, yeah, true, poor, country
9 like, people, don, can, just, think, time, get, want, love
10 will, can, best, right, really, one, hope, now, something, good
Table 6: Terms extracted from LDA topics of posts from Russian trolls
on Reddit.
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Figure 13: Top 20 subreddits that Russian trolls were active and their
respective percentage of posts.
Ukrainian campaign. Overall, we can observe the impact of
the Crimean conflict, with essentially all domains posted by
the Russian trolls being Russian language or Russian oriented.
One exception to Russian language sites is RT, the Russian-
controlled propaganda outlet. The Iranian trolls similarly post
more “localized” domains, for example, jordan-times, but we
also see them heavily pushing the IUVM fake news network.
When it comes to Russian trolls on Reddit, we find that they
were mostly posting random images through Imgur (image-
hosting site, 27.6% of the URLs), likely in an attempt to accu-
mulate karma score. We also note a substantial portion of URLs
to (fake) news sites linked with the Internet Research Agency
like blackmattersus.com (8.3%) and donotshootus.us (3.6%).
6 Influence Estimation
Thus far, we have analyzed the behavior of Russian and Iranian
trolls on Twitter and Reddit, with a special focus on how they
evolved over time. Allegedly, one of their main goals is to ma-
nipulate the opinion of other users and extend the cascade of
information that they share (e.g., lure other users into posting
Domain (Russian
trolls on Twitter (%)
Domain(Iranian
trolls on Twitter) (%)
Domain (Russian
trolls on Reddit) (%)
livejournal.com 5.4% awdnews.com 29.3% imgur.com 27.6%
riafan.ru 5.0% dlvr.it 7.1% blackmattersus.com 8.3%
twitter.com 2.5% fb.me 4.8% donotshoot.us 3.6%
ift.tt 1.8% whatsupic.com 4.2% reddit.com 1.9%
ria.ru 1.8% googl.gl 3.9% nytimes.com 1.5%
googl.gl 1.7% realnienovosti.com 2.1% theguardian.com 1.4%
dlvr.it 1.5% twitter.com 1.7% cnn.com 1.3%
gazeta.ru 1.4% libertyfrontpress.com 1.6% foxnews.com 1.2%
yandex.ru 1.2% iuvmpress.com 1.5% youtube.com 1.2%
j.mp 1.1% buff.ly 1.4% washingtonpost.com 1.2%
rt.com 0.8% 7sabah.com 1.3% huffingntonpost.com 1.1%
nevnov.ru 0.7% bit.ly 1.2% photographyisnotacrime.com 1.0%
youtu.be 0.6% documentinterdit.com 1.0% butthis.com 1.0%
vesti.ru 0.5% facebook.com 0.8% thefreethoughtproject.com 0.9%
kievsmi.net 0.5% al-hadath24.com 0.7% dailymail.co.uk 0.7%
youtube.com 0.5% jordan-times.com 0.7% rt.com 0.7%
kiev-news.com 0.5% iuvmonline.com 0.6% politico.com 0.6%
inforeactor.ru 0.4% youtu.be 0.6% reuters.com 0.6%
lenta.ru 0.4% alwaght.com 0.5% youtu.be 0.6%
emaidan.com.ua 0.3% ift.tt 0.5% nbcnews.com 0.6 %
Table 7: Top 20 domains included in tweets/posts from Russian and
Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
Events per community Total
URLs
shared by /pol/ Reddit Twitter Gab The Donald Iran Russia Events URLs
Russians 76,155 366,319 1,225,550 254,016 61,968 0 151,222 2,135,230 48,497
Iranians 3,274 28,812 232,898 5,763 971 19,629 0 291,347 4,692
Both 331 2,060 85,467 962 283 334 565 90,002 153
Table 8: Total number of events in each community for URLs shared
by a) Russian trolls; b) Iranian trolls; and c) Both Russian and Iranian
trolls.
similar content) [14]. Therefore, we now set out to determine
their impact in terms of the dissemination of information on
Twitter, and on the greater Web.
To assess their influence, we look at three different groups of
URLs: 1) URLs shared by Russian trolls on Twitter, 2) URLs
shared by Iranian trolls on Twitter, and 3) URLs shared by both
Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter. We then find all posts
that include any of these URLs in the following Web commu-
nities: Reddit, Twitter (from the 1% Streaming API, with posts
from confirmed Russian and Iranian trolls removed), Gab, and
4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/). For Reddit and Twit-
ter our dataset spans January 2016 to October 2018, for /pol/ it
spans July 2016 to October 2018, and for Gab it spans August
2016 to October 2018.1 We select these communities as previ-
ous work shows they play an important and influential role on
the dissemination of news [55] and memes [54].
Table 8 summarizes the number of events (i.e., occurrences
of a given URL) for each community/group of users that we
consider (Russia refers to Russian trolls on Twitter, while Iran
refers to Iranian trolls on Twitter). Note that we decouple
The Donald from the rest of Reddit as previous work showed
1NB: the 4chan dataset made available by the authors of [55, 54] starts in late
June 2016 and Gab was first launched in August 2016.
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0.28%4.85%1.47%0.33%1.45%60.99%
4.00%18.74%13.76%4.30%85.32%14.84%
7.08%6.65%9.57%91.33%5.19%5.48%
2.01%7.09%63.45%1.29%2.51%5.72%
1.14%61.61%9.85%1.46%4.55%11.89%
85.49%1.06%1.90%1.29%0.97%1.08%
(a) Russian trolls
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0.11%2.06%2.23%0.18%0.48%77.38%
5.66%25.12%21.62%2.00%91.07%13.64%
4.61%10.94%13.72%97.24%5.39%4.15%
0.32%7.68%57.41%0.16%1.05%2.70%
0.05%52.68%3.97%0.12%0.62%1.14%
89.25%1.52%1.05%0.31%1.39%0.98%
(b) Iranian trolls
/pol/ Reddit Twitter Gab T_D Iran Russia
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1.46%0.84%15.01%65.23%0.15%1.96%6.61%
0.61%0.34%46.75%2.76%0.09%2.34%3.90%
0.88%37.35%0.00%0.15%0.03%0.13%0.27%
77.26%1.78%0.35%0.53%0.07%0.50%0.03%
(c) Both
Figure 14: Percent of destination events caused by the source community to the destination community for URLs shared by a) Russian trolls; b)
Iranian trolls; and c) both Russian and Iranian trolls.
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(a) Russian trolls
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(b) Iranian trolls
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Figure 15: Influence from source to destination community, normalized by the number of events in the source community for URLs shared by
a) Russian trolls; b) Iranian trolls; and c) Both Russian and Iranian trolls. We also include the total external influence of each community.
that it is quite efficient in pushing information in other com-
munities [54]. From the table we make several observations:
1) Twitter has the largest number of events in all groups of
URLs mainly because it is the largest community and 2) Gab
has a considerably large number of events; more than /pol/ and
The Donald, which are bigger communities.
For each unique URL, we fit a statistical model known as
Hawkes Processes [29, 30], which allows us to estimate the
strength of connections between each of these communities in
terms of how likely an event – the URL being posted by ei-
ther trolls or normal users to a particular platform – is to cause
subsequent events in each of the groups. We fit each Hawkes
model using the methodology presented by [54]. In a nutshell,
by fitting a Hawkes model we obtain all the necessary parame-
ters that allow us to assess the root cause of each event (i.e., the
community that is “responsible” for the creation of the event).
By aggregating the root causes for all events we are able to
measure the influence and efficiency of each Web community
we considered.
We demonstrate our results with two different metrics: 1) the
absolute influence, or percentage of events on the destination
community caused by events on the source community and
2) the influence relative to size, which shows the number of
events caused on the destination platform as a percent of the
number of events on the source platform. The latter can also
be interpreted as a measure of how efficient a community is in
pushing URLs to other communities.
Fig. 14 reports our results for the absolute influence for each
group of URLs. When looking at the influence for the URLs
shared by Russian trolls on Twitter (Fig. 14(a)), we find that
Russian trolls were particularly influential to users from Gab
(1.9%), the rest of Twitter (1.29%), and /pol/ (1.08%). When
looking at the communities that influenced the Russian trolls we
find the rest of Twitter (7%) followed by Reddit (4%). By look-
ing at URLs shared by Iranian trolls on Twitter (Fig. 14(b)), we
find that Iranian trolls were most successful in pushing URLs
to The Donald (1.52%), the rest of Reddit (1.39%), and Gab
(1.05%), somewhat ironic considering The Donald and Gab’s
zealous pro-Trump leanings and the Iranian trolls’ clear anti-
Trump leanings [19, 53]. Similarly to Russian trolls, the Ira-
nian trolls were most influenced by Reddit (5.6%) and the rest
of Twitter (4.6%). When looking at the URLs posted by both
Russian and Iranian trolls we find that, overall, the Russian
trolls were more influential in spreading URLs to the other Web
communities with the exception of (again, somewhat ironically)
/pol/.
But how do these results change when we normalize the in-
fluence with respect to the number of events that each com-
munity creates? Fig. 15 shows the influence relative to size for
each pair of communities/groups of users. For URLs shared by
Russian trolls (Fig. 15(a)) we find that Russian trolls were par-
ticularly efficient in spreading the URLs to Twitter (10.4%)—
which is not a surprise, given that the accounts operate directly
on this platform—and Gab (3.19%). For the URLs shared by
Iranian trolls, we again observe that were most efficient in
pushing the URLs to Twitter (3.6%), and the rest of Reddit
(2.04%). Also, it is worth noting that in both groups of URLs
The Donald had the highest external influence to the other plat-
forms. This highlights that The Donald is an impactful actor
in the information ecosystem and is quite possibly exploited by
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trolls as a vector to push specific information to other communi-
ties. Finally, when looking at the URLs shared by both Russian
and Iranian trolls, we find that Russian trolls were more effi-
cient (greater impact relative to the number of URLs posted) at
spreading URLs in all the communities with the exception of
/pol/, where Iranians were more efficient.
7 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the behavior and evolution of Rus-
sian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit during the course
of several years. We shed light to the target campaigns of each
group of trolls, we examined how their behavior evolved over
time, and what content they disseminated. Furthermore, we find
some interesting differences between the trolls depending on
their origin and the platform from which they operate. For in-
stance, for the latter, we find discussions related to cryptocur-
rencies only on Reddit by Russian trolls, while for the former
we find that Russian trolls were pro-Trump and Iranian trolls
anti-Trump. Also, we quantify the influence that these state-
sponsored trolls had on several mainstream and alternative Web
communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab), showing that
Russian trolls were more efficient and influential in spreading
URLs on other Web communities than Iranian trolls, with the
exception of /pol/. In addition, we make our source code pub-
licly available [56], which helps in reproducing our results and
it is an important step towards understanding other types of
state-sponsored troll accounts on Twitter.
Our findings have serious implications for society at large.
First, our analysis shows that while troll accounts use peculiar
tactics and talking points to further their agendas, these are not
completely disjoint from regular users, and therefore develop-
ing automated systems to identify and block such accounts re-
mains an open challenge. Second, our results also indicate that
automated systems to detect trolls are likely to be difficult to
realize: trolls change their behavior over time, and thus even a
classifier that works perfectly on one campaign might not catch
future campaigns. Third, and perhaps most worrying, we find
that state-sponsored trolls have a meaningful amount of influ-
ence on fringe communities like The Donald, 4chan’s /pol/, and
Gab, and that the topics pushed by the trolls resonate strongly
with these communities. This might be due to users on these
communities that sympathize with the views the trolls aim to
share (i.e., “useful idiots”) or to unidentified state-sponsored
actors on these communities. In either case, considering recent
tragic events like the Tree of Life Synagogue shootings, per-
petrated by a Gab user seemingly influenced by content posted
there, the potential for mass societal upheaval cannot be over-
stated. Because of this, we implore the research community, as
well as governments and non-government organizations to ex-
pend whatever resources are at their disposal to develop tech-
nology and policy to address this new, and effective, form of
digital warfare.
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